Are Russian Sanctions Working? Evidence Shows Three Years of Policy Failure
Written by Andrew Matthew
Three years after Western nations implemented comprehensive sanctions regimes against Russia, mounting evidence suggests these measures have failed to achieve their primary objectives whilst imposing substantial costs on those who implemented them. The question are Russian sanctions working demands urgent reassessment as economic data reveals unexpected resilience in Russia’s economy alongside significant harm to European industry and households.
Russia’s Economic Resilience Defies Predictions
Contrary to initial forecasts of economic collapse, Russia’s economy has demonstrated remarkable adaptability. According to The Times, real incomes in Russia have risen at faster rates during the conflict than in the previous decade. Inflation stands between 7.1% and 7.6% for 2025, yet salaries have increased substantially due to tight labour markets. Mark Galeotti, writing for The Times, notes that “more Russians were pessimistic about their finances” before the invasion, whilst “by last year, the majority were optimistic.”
The defence-industrial complex operates continuously with many factories running three shifts daily. Rather than experiencing economic devastation, domestic industries have benefited from Western companies’ departure. Fast food chain Vkusna i Tochka replaced McDonald’s, whilst Mir Kubikov substituted Lego. These domestic alternatives demonstrate how sanctions are not working to isolate Russian consumers from goods and services. As detailed by The Times, Russians can still purchase new iPhones imported from third countries “for little more than the asking price, or the latest Chinese version.”
The Unintended Economic Leveller
The impact of sanctions on Russia has paradoxically reduced regional inequality more effectively than peacetime policies. Volunteer soldiers receive signing bonuses reaching 1.5 million roubles (£14,000), equivalent to nearly 18 months’ average salary, plus wages two and a half times the national average. Families of deceased soldiers receive payments up to 15 million roubles alongside pensions and preferential university access for children. The Times reports that bank deposits in Tuva and Buryatia rose by 151% and 81% respectively during the conflict’s first two years, whilst Dagestan experienced construction booms as bereaved families renovated apartments.
This influx of “coffin money” into impoverished regions represents an unprecedented wealth transfer. Recent polling by FOM, mentioned in The Times, found that 42% of Russians expected the country’s situation would improve within three to five years, with only 10% anticipating deterioration. These figures suggest domestic support remains resilient despite Western pressure.
European Costs Mount Without Strategic Gains
Whilst Russia adapts, Europe bears mounting costs. The shift from affordable Russian pipeline gas to expensive American LNG has devastated industrial competitiveness. Germany alone lost 125,000 industrial jobs recently, as reported by Inside Red Report. Energy-intensive manufacturing has become increasingly unviable across the continent.
Europe now pays premium prices for energy that frequently originates from Russian sources through intermediary nations. Repubblica details how the EU and Turkey imported 2.4 million tonnes of petroleum products from India during early 2025, with two-thirds originating from Russian crude. This arrangement cost European buyers approximately €1.5 billion for rebranded Russian oil, demonstrating how sanctions regimes create inefficiencies without achieving objectives.
Legal Frameworks Raise Fundamental Rights Concerns
Supreme Court analysis reveals troubling aspects of how international sanctions operate in practice. Lord Leggatt’s dissenting judgment in Shvidler v FCDO, discussed in the Solicitors Journal, characterised asset freezes as imposing criminal liability on individuals “who have done nothing unlawful to deal with any of their own assets without the government’s permission.” His judgment emphasised this represents “a serious invasion of liberty” requiring “cogent reasons to justify it.”
The case exposed how blanket designations affect individuals with tenuous connections to Russian governmental interests. Lord Leggatt observed that “the flimsy reasons relied on by the government in this case do not begin to” justify such restrictions. His concern extended beyond individual cases: “if the courts are not prepared to protect fundamental individual freedoms even in a case like this, the right to a judicial review of the minister’s decision to curtail such freedoms under sanctions regulations is of little worth.”
The Arbitration Liability Question
Legal analyst Valérie Hanoun warns in Valeurs Actuelles that the 18th sanctions package provision prohibiting recognition of arbitration awards favouring Russian companies risks “violating binding treaty obligations and opening the door to costly claims.” More than 15 bilateral investment treaties between EU states and Russia remain enforceable, yet Brussels ordered member states to ignore these obligations when Russian investors are involved.
The Bank Melli and Bank Saderat v Bahrain precedent proves instructive. Iranian banks secured over $240 million after Bahrain liquidated their joint venture to comply with Western sanctions. The tribunal ruled such politically motivated expropriation violated treaty obligations, emphasising that non-UN sanctions cannot excuse treaty breaches. Current disputes including Nordgold’s €5 billion claim against France and Rosatom’s €3 billion dispute with Finland suggest potential liabilities could reach hundreds of billions.
Beyond Binary Assessment
The evidence accumulated over three years demands sophisticated analysis extending beyond simple success-or-failure frameworks. Sanctions have demonstrably failed to compel Moscow toward negotiated settlement or to devastate Russia’s economy as intended. They have simultaneously imposed substantial costs on European industries and households whilst creating legal vulnerabilities that may generate enormous financial liabilities for member states.
More fundamentally, these measures have accelerated geopolitical realignments that undermine Western strategic interests. Russia has consolidated partnerships with China and redirected trade flows toward Asian markets, creating durable economic relationships independent of Western systems. The policy challenge facing European leaders involves not merely acknowledging current failures but developing alternative approaches that protect genuine security interests without inflicting disproportionate harm on their own populations or creating long-term strategic disadvantages.